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nan, Marshall and Stevens, filed a dis-
senting opinion and argued that the 
majority's holding was in direct conflict 
with the plain meaning of the Confron-
tation Clause. The dissenters attacked 
the majority's analogy to the admission 
of hearsay evidence, noting that the 
hearsay exceptions generally included a 
requirement of the unavailability of the 
declarant, a point which the majority 
seemed to ignore. Id. at 3174 (Scalia,]., 
dissenting). Concluding, the dis.sent 
stated: "The Court today has applied 'in-
terest balancing' analysis where the text 
of the Constitution simply does not 
permit it. We are not free to conduct a 
cost-benefit analysis of clear and explicit 
constitutional guarantees, and then to 
adjust their meaning to comport to our 
findings." Id. at 3176 (Scalia,]., dissent-
ing). "[T]he text of the Sixth Amend-
ment is clear, and because the Constitu-
tion is meant to protect against, rather 
than conform to, current 'widespread 
belief,' I respectfully dissent." Id. at 
3172 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
The opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Maryland v. Craig validates a procedure 
which will greatly increase the State's 
ability to successfully prosecute alleged 
perpetrators of child abuse. Perhaps 
more importantly, this opinion reveals 
the willingness of the current Court to 
look beyond the literal meaning of con-
stitutional guarantees and instead con-
centrate on the "essence" of the right, 
thereby preserving the notion of the 
Constitution as a flexible document. 
- Gregory J. Swain 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.: 
OPINIONS ARE NOT 
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT AND ARE 
THEREFORE ACTIONABLE 
UNDER STATE UBEL LAW 
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 
110 S. Ct. 2695 ( 1990) the United States 
Supreme Court held that statements of 
opinion are not protected by the first 
amendment and, therefore, are actiona-
ble under state libel law. In holding so, 
the Court reversed the Ohio Court of 
Appeals and remanded the case for a 
determination as to whether the state-
ments were true or false. 
Lorain Journal Co. published an arti-
cle authored by J. Theodore Diadiun 
(hereinafter "respondents") including 
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incriminating comments about the peti-
tioner, Michael Milkovich, a high school 
wrestling coach whose team was in-
volved in an altercation following a 
match. Milkovich and Scott, the school 
superintendent, testified at the Ohio 
High School Athletic Association 
(OHSAA) investigatory hearing and sub-
sequent trial. Both proceedings were 
discussed in a journal article entitled 
"Maple beat the law with the 'big lie,''' 
along with a picture of Diadiun and the 
words "TO says." Among other phrases, 
the article contained the following pas-
sage: "Anyone who attended the meet ... 
knows in his heart that Milkovich and 
Scott lied at the hearing after each hav-
ing given his solemn oath to tell the 
truth." Id. at 2698. Thus, Milkovich and 
Scott brought separate defamation ac-
tions against the respondents in Ohio 
State Court. Id. at 2699. 
Milkovich alleged that the article di-
rectly damaged his occupation of coach 
and teacher by accusing him of commit-
ting perjury, and that this constituted 
libel per se. Id. A directed verdict was 
granted in favor of the respondents on 
the grounds that there was insufficient 
evidence to establish "actual malice" as 
required by New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Milkovich, 
110 S. Ct. at 2699. The Ohio Court of 
Appeals disagreed and the decision was 
reversed and remanded. Id. at 2700. 
On remand, the trial court granted 
the respondent's motion for summary 
judgment, holding that the article con· 
stituted opinion constitutionally pro-
tected from a libel action. Alternatively, 
the court found that Milkovich, as a pub-
lic figure, failed to make out a prima 
facie case of actual malice. The court of 
appeals affirmed. Id 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Ohio found that Milkovich was neither a 
public figure nor a public official. The 
court also held that the statements were 
factual assertions as a matter of law and 
not constitutionally protected as the 
opinions of the writer. Id 
Two years later, the Ohio Supreme 
Court reversed its position in Scott's 
defamation action, finding that the col-
umn was constitutionally protected 
opinion Id. The Scott court, in ascertain-
ing whether the column was fact or 
opinion under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, applied the four factor 
analysis established by the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in 
Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 
(1985). Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2700. 
Those factors were "( 1) 'the specific 
language used;' (2) 'whether the state-
ment is verifiable;' (3) 'the general con-
text of the statement;' and (4) 'the 
broader context in which the statement 
appeared.'" Id. (quoting Scott v. News-
Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250, 496 
N.E.2d 699,706 (1986». 
Although the Scott court determined -
that the first two factors indicated that 
the statements at issue were assertions 
of fact, the court held that based on the 
third and fourth factors the article was 
opinion as a matter of law. Id. With 
respect to the third, "general context of 
the statement," factor, "the large cap-
tion 'TO says' ... would indicate to even 
the most gullible reader that the article 
was, in fact, opinion." Id. (quotingScott, 
25 Ohio St. 3d at 252, 496 N.E.2d at 
707). With respect to the fourth factor, 
the "broader context in which the state-
ment appeared," the court reasoned 
that because the article appeared on a 
sports page - 'a traditional haven for 
cajoling, invective, and hyperbole,' that 
article would probably be construed as 
opinion.Id. at 2701 (quoting Scott, 25 
Ohio St. 3d at 253-54, 496 N.E.2d at 
708). As a result of the Scott decision 
the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld a 
summary judgment against Milkovich. 
Id. An appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Ohio was dismissed for want of a sub-
stantial constitutional question, and the 
United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to consider the Ohio court's 
recognition of a constitutionally re-
quired opinion exception under the 
first amendment. 
The Supreme Court began its analysis 
by discussing the development of defa-
mation law under the common law. The 
Court first stressed the importance of 
allowing a person to vindicate his good 
name while affording redress for harm 
caused by defamatory statements. Id. at 
2702. 
At common law, a defamed private 
figure needed only to prove a false pub-
lication which subjected him to "hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule." Id. (quoting 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 370 (1974) (White, ]., dissent-
ing». The distinction between fact and 
opinion, the Court explained, did not 
exist.Id. 
The Court explained, however, that 
the affirmative defense known as "fair 
comment" was incorporat<;:d into com-
mon law, applying only to expressions of 
opinion. This principle, "afford[ed] legal 
immunity for the honest expression of 
opinion on matters of legitimate public 
interest when based upon a true or privi-
leged statement of fact." Id. at 2703 
(quoting 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of 
Torts § 5.28 (1956». The Court found 
that the purpose of "fair comment" was 
to balance free and uninhibited discus-
sion of public issues with the need to 
redress injury to reputation caused by 
invidious irresponsible speech. Id. 
To further protect freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press and uninhibited 
debate, the Court explained, it began to 
require public officials to prove defama-
tory statements were made with 'actual 
malice.' Id. (citing New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 u.s. 254 (1964». The 
New York Times 'actual malice' test was 
later extended to public figures, defined 
as those persons "intimately involved in 
the resolution of important public ques-
tions or, by reason of their fame, shape 
events in areas of concern to society at 
large." Id. (quoting Curtis Publishing 
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967». The 
required standard of proof for both pub-
lic officials and public figures, the Court 
noted, was clear and convincing evi-
dence.Id. at 2703-04 (citing Gertz, 418 
U.S. at 342). 
The distinction between public and 
private individuals, the Court reasoned, 
was predicated not only on the fact that 
public persons voluntarily exposed them-
selves to the increased risk of defama-
tion, but also had greater opportunity to 
counteract any false statements through 
effective communication channels. Id 
at 2704 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-
45). However, the Court did not extend 
the 'actual malice' standard to private 
persons concerning matters of public 
interest. Id. (citing Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 ( 1971 ) ). 
The Court discussed further limita-
tions placed on the damages recovera-
ble in libel actions. First, liability could 
not be imposed without some showing 
of fault. Id. Second, punitive damages 
were not recoverable without a show-
ing of 'actual malice.' Id Finally, the 
Court had held that it could no longer 
be presumed that defamatory speech 
was false, as under common law. More-
over, the burden of showing falsity and 
fault was on the allegedly defamed plain-
tiff and not on the media defendant who 
previously was required to prove truth. 
Id. (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, 
Inc.v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776(1986». 
The Court then noted its recognition 
of constitutional limitations on the type 
of speech which could serve as a basis 
for a defamation action. Id Constitu-
tionallyprotected speech, not subject to 
defamation law included "loose figura-
tive speech," "merely rhetorical hyper-
bole," as well as, "lusty and imaginative 
expression of contempt." Id. at 2705 
(quoting Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 
U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974». 
Milkovich, attempted to persuade the 
Court to recognize an additional protec-
tion for statements characterized as 
opinions as opposed to fact. He relied on 
dictum from Gertz which basically reit-
eratedJustice Holmes' "marketplace of 
ideas" concept. Id. Yet the argument, 
equating "opinion" with "idea," was re-
jected by the Court, which stated that 
the passage relied upon from Gertz was 
not "intended to create a wholesale def-
amation exception for anything that 
might be labeled 'opinion.'" Id. 
The Court noted that expressions of 
opinion may often imply an assertion of 
objective facts. Id. For example, the 
statement "[i]n my opinion Jones is a 
liar," the court believed could cause as 
much damage to one's reputation as the 
statement, "Jones is a liar." Id. at 2706. 
"[It] would be destructive of the law of 
libel if a writer could escape liability for 
accusationsof[ defumatoryconduct ] simply 
by using, explicitly or implicitly, the 
words 'I think.'" Id. (quoting Cianci v. 
New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 
64 (2d Cir. 1980». 
The Court stated that public figures 
and officials must show that defamatory 
statements were made with knowledge 
of their falsity or with reckless disregard 
of the truth. Id. at 2707. Alternatively, 
statements involving private individuals 
on matters of public concern place the 
burden on the plaintiff to show that the 
false connotations were made with some 
level of fault as required by Gertz. Id 
Thus, on matters of public concern, 
statements must be provable as false 
before liability can be imposed under 
state defamation laws, at least when they 
involve a media defendant. Id. (citing 
Hepps, 475 U.S. at 772). 
Turning to the facts of the instant 
case, the Court found that the language 
used in the article about Milkovich was 
not "loose, figurative or hyperbolic lan-
guage." Id Additionally, the Court stated 
that neither the language, nor the general 
tenor of the article, negated the impres-
sion that the author seriously maintained 
that Milkovich committed the crime of 
perjury. Id. 
The Court noted that the truth could 
be ascertained by comparing, inter alia, 
Milkovich's testimony at the OHSAA 
hearing with his subsequent testimony 
in trial court. Therefore, the connota-
tion that Milkovich committed perjury 
was an articulation of an objectively 
verifiable event. Id. Consequently, the 
Court remanded the case for a determi-
nation of whether or not the statements 
were false. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Su-
preme Court managed to intricately bal-
ance first amendment values. Namely, it 
balanced the vital guarantee of freedom 
of speech as it relates to the press and 
the uninhibited discussion of public 
issues against the pervasively strong in-
terest of preventing reputations from 
being falsely dishonored. Thus, the 
Court, in a unanimous decision, opted 
not to provide even more protection to 
media defendants by failing to recognize 
an opinion exception to state defama-
tion laws. 
- Kimberly A. Doyle 
Illinois v. Perkins: UNDERCOVER 
AGENTS NEED NOT GIVE 
MIRANDA WARNINGS TO 
INCARCERATED SUSPECTS 
BEFORE ASKING QUESTIONS 
WHICH MAY EliCIT 
INCRIMINATING RESPONSES 
In Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 
( 1990), the Supreme Court held that 
the fifth amendment does not require 
undercover government agents posing 
as inmates to give Miranda warnings to 
incarcerated suspects before asking 
questions that may elicit incriminating 
responses. The Court found that no 
coercive atmosphere exists when an 
incarcerated suspect voluntarily makes 
incriminating statements to an officer 
he assumes to be a fellow inmate. 
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